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This paper IS an attempt to re-open that debate. It will outline the issues and provide a bold pohcy prescnption for a U S led solution to the global land mme cnsls. Bold solutions are necessary because the U S. cannot lead across the Bndge to the 2 1 st Century by pretense. The U S must first lead by example, and then others will follow THE LAND MINE DEBATE Today, and for the foreseeable future, the issue cotiontmg the world commumty IS the urldespread illegitimate use of an otherwIse legtnnate, and as some beheve, a necessary weapon that has caused unnecessary suffenng of epxdermc proportlons to non-combatants. There are (/z actually two separate problems The first deals with the existing problem of lad mmes, the second deals with the global trade m land mines --the production, use, transfer, and stockplhng of land mmes Other than to descnbe the impact of land mines already m the ground, the problem of existing lrud mmes will not be addressed 111 ths paper Locatmg these mmes poses a substantial technologcal challenge far different from current mlhtary breachmg techmques through known mme'fields Instead, they require technologies to locate and destroy small numbers of mines left after a long-forgotten battle, set out on a penmeter by small patrols makmg camp, dehberately placed to dnve c1~1~an.s fi-om an area, or even those washed from the p"
4When Ambassador Madeleme Albnght traveled to Angola m early 1996, she was deeply moved by the large number of ch&i.ren she had seen who had lost hmbs m land mme explosions On her return, she wrote Secretary Perry, Secretary Chnstopher, and Tony Lake requestmg that a Deputies Comnuttee or Special Review Group be tasked with the responslblhty of de\ elopmg pohcy options and makmg recomrnendatlons In the subsequent months, the debate occured, but only between DOD and the F-SC Ambassador Albnght was isolated from the nuhtary review . Requirements for Anti-Personnel Landmines 1 Protect other mmes (an&tank) or obstacles from dmmunted forces 2 Provide an economy of force 3 Act as a protecuve obstacle 4 Act as a psychological deterrent
Mlhtanes argue that land mmes are cntlcal and legtimate battlefield weapons In today's -hghly developed form of maneuver warfare, the U.S nuhtary uses land rnmes to counter enemy mob&y, shape the battlefield to its advantage, and protect exposed flanks from counterattacks and create defensive positions when deployed Mmefields have been an mtegral part of many phases of warfightmg In Operation Desert Storm, for example, coahtlon forces used au--delivered anti-tank mmes to protect the nght flank of U S. and Bntlsh forces wtile they swung around Iraqi troops m Kuwait. These mines were mdlspensable to preventing a counter-attack on the exposed Amencan/Bntlsh flank.
Land mines are also mexpenslve force multlphers and can often assist a small force m defending against a larger attackmg force Not only does thus represent an nnportant advantage to nuhtary forces that are downslzmg, but also to those small groups engaged m local conflict throughout the world This inexpensive, but greatly added tactical utlhty ensures that the land mme cnsls first seen m Afghamstan, Cambodia, and Mozambique ~11 most certamly continue, if not worsen Land mines also provide an economical means to deter and raise the cost of aggression, to delay enemy forces m the event of an attack, and to counter the posslblhty of surpnse On the Korean de-mlhtanzed zone, the South Koreans use barner mmefields extensively. Sun&r 4 F* mmefields exist around the world between hostrle nations or opposmg forces, such as the border between Kashrmr and Pakrstan, which is heavrly mmed More recently, Peru lard 6,000 mines near its border wrth Ecuador 5
Despite the tactical advantages of land mmes, the same maneuver reqmrements that take advantage of mmes also demonstrate the downsrde of land mines --their longevity. Forces cannot easrly advance across terrain they have prevrously mined U S ground forces are tramed to bypass or breach then own mmefields, creatmg lanes for follow-on forces to pass through It IS not easy, but rt can be done. Consequently, the mrlitanes of most industnahzed countnes have mcreasingly turned to sophrstrcated mmes that self-destruct after a certain penod of time, often withm four to ten hours ti-tank versus Arm-Personnel There 1s an nnportant drstmctron between arm-tank nunes and arm-personnel mmes "Antr-personnel (AP) mmes are desrgned to kill or wound soldiers "6 "Arm-tank (AT) mmes are designed to nnmobrhze or destroy tracked and wheeled vehicles and the vehrcles crews and passengers "' Today, most highly mechamzed mrhtary forces depIoy a mrx of antr-personnel mines wrth arm-tank mmes to protect the antr-tank mines fi-om being easily disabled by enemy infantry soldrers Arm-tank mmes are essentral to highly maneuverable mechamzed warfare In June 1994, a well respected analyst for the Instrtute of Defense Analysrs, Dr Stephen Brddle, concluded a study on land mmes that supported several observatrons * Frrst, land mines have nnhtary utrhty 5"Peru Land Ames Blastmg Jungle" Taronto Star, 27 December 1996, A30 TINS arhcle reported that the Peruvian Army planted mmes m an area that IS the home to hundreds of natives As a result' two people have &ed and many chldren have been mJured and manned The mrhtary utility versus humamtanan concerns debate quickly focuses on two issues, unnecessary suffenng and noncombatant mmmmty.
lgUn-named sources at National Ground Intelligence Center, mtervlew by author The "moral traces" left by the presumption agamst the use of force mclude the cntenon that weapons should not mfllct unnecessary suffermg upon the human person, whether a combatant or a civilian Th~s restraint 1s reflected m both legal and moral pohcles about warfare In the twelfth century, an effort was made to ban the crossbow, while the mneteenth century focused its attention on the dum-dum bullet. In both mstances, the argument was based not on a weapons' mdlscrimmateness, but on the suffermg they caused even if used with dlscnmmatlon 20
An outspoken semor defense legal advisor, W Hays Parks, renounces the apphcablhty of mtemafional law prolubltmg superfluous mjury or unnecessary suffering by comparmg land mmes to other weapons m common use today 21 He argues that mJunes are sirmlar to those -fcaused by small arms, arhllery, armor, and avlatlon-dehvered ordnance, and as such are a necessary cost of war, not mere unnecessary suffermg Katurally, tis "snnilar~ty" logic appeals to those favormg contmued use of land mmes by the mlhtary But, however sound Mi-Parks' loplc, it defies the logic put forth m Captam Green's article --the capablhty to act as a psychological deterrent (fi-om mannmg) IS so overwhehnmg it becomes a mandatory requirement for any "successful" future alternative 22 Death IS not the object, rather, the object IS to inflict mtentlonal superfluous mJury to exploit the effects of dehberate and necessary suffenng, even when used with dlscnmmatlon When arguing the issue of noncombatants, Mr Parks sheds the tear of the mnocents, that noncombatants have suffered from the mdlscnrmnate use of land mines! However, he quickly points out the problem 1s not a result of land mme use m conflicts between responsible (mnocent)
nations Instead, the present problem 1s a result of use, or more appropnately misuse, of an otherwise legal weapon "by msurgent groups or developing nations vvlth poor human nghts records "23 Predictably, the U S military has steadfastly held to its "mnocence," and m On the mrtratrve of the U S , the self-destruct mme became the cornerstone for the amended protocol Miy believed (and still do) that short of a total ban, the self-destructmg land mme provided an answer to the mdrscnmmate characterrstrc of land nnnes The self-destruct mechanism ensures that the mme will not only be disabled, but also that rt cannot be re-used As the rnme is powered by a battery, a natural back-up feature exists that will ensure self-deactivation of the mme, even if the self-destruct mechamsm farls to work. As battenes deplete eventually, these rnmes are guaranteed to become harmless to mnocent c~vlhans at some point A similar tecbnologrcally advanced mine, the self-neutrahzmg mme renders the firmg 14 mechamsm moperatrve, but does not destroy the mine. Consequently, rt must still be treated as a live mme Unfortunately, many countnes do not yet have the technology to develop and field self-destructmg rnmes If such technology were avarlable, the cost of replacmg exrstmg stockprles wrth self-destructmg mmes would be prombrtrve. The purchase cost of a self-destructmg nnne ranges from $50 to S 100 per land mme 28 Instead, delegations retamed the nght to use mmes other than self-destructmg mines, but restncted then use (long-hved mmes) to marked and momtored areas But, even this met wrth difficulty, and countries either refused to agree to the provision or reqmred lengthy phase-in penods for compliance In the end, the amended protocol provided for Clear and drstmct requirements for the markmg, momtonng, and clearmg of nnnefields or mined areas
Requn-ements that arm-personnel land mmes used outside marked and momtored areas must self-destruct wnh.m 30 days and mclude a reliable self-deactrvatron back-up feature designed to render the mme harmless within 120 days (subject to an optronal deferral penod of up to mne years)
As widespread rllegmmate use of mines IS found prnnanly m mternal conflict, many delegations supported wrdemng the scope, winch prevrously applied only to confhcts between nation-states Expectedly, tlus proposal was mmally met with a great deal of opposrtron from a number of non-western states who saw rt as an assault on then sovereignty and an attempt by western countnes to rmpmge on then domestic affarrs Nevertheless, the amended protocol included language to Extend the scope from mtemational armed confhcts to mclude mtemal confhcts At the final plenary sessron, the Umted States lamed a number of other States Parties m declanng its intent to apply the amended protocol at all times, includmg peacetime For snmlar reasons, the conference worked to hmlt transfer of mmes to non-state actors.
The amended Protocol prohrbrts the transfer of land mmes the use of which 1s prolublted States Parties also agreed not to transfer mmes to any recrplent other than a State
Because the protocol did not ban the use of land mmes, the conference aggressively pursued requrrements to make them detectable, especially once a confhct was over But agam, even thrs provision met considerable resrstance. Many countnes could not afford the cost of modrfymg exlstmg stockpiles or replacmg them with new mmes, and m the end, agreed to a phase-m approach.
The amended Protocol prolubrts the use of non-detectable arm-personnel land mmes (subJect to an optronal deferral penod of up to nme years) . The U S. has decided not to support the Ottawa process. Although some would say tis proves U S. hypocnsy on the issue, President Clinton has decided to support the UN Conference 34Tanada Snubs LX Bid to Ban Landmmes" Fznanczal Post, 18 February 1997, Dally Ed, 2 on Disarmament as a more appropnate forum for negotiatmg a comprehensive ban. Although he stated the Ottawa Process served a useful purpose by provldmg momentum, the Conference on Disarmament was a more practical forum because it mcluded the key states (Russia, Chma, India, and Pa&tan) necessary to negotiate a truly worldkmde comprehenslve ban Even before the President's new pohcy was announced m May 1996, there was an ongomg dialogue wlthm the mteragency as to the appropnate venue to lIlltlate the negotiations integral to the pohcy Key to the debate was how to mclude those countnes with the largest stockpiles, Russia and China. In January 1997, the debate ended when President Clinton called on the UN Conference on Disarmament m Geneva to mhate negotiations on a worldwide treaty banmng the use, production, stockpllmg, and transfer of antI-personnel land mmes 35 There are three issues before the Conference: nuclear disarmament, fisslle matenal cut-off, and a comprehensive ban on land mines As the first two are unhkely to a&eve consensus for a mandate, negotiations on land mmes appear to be the natural default There 1s apparently support for a mandate wlthm the Conference, but as the Conference IS a 61-nation body that operates by consensus, any country can block movement on the issue Reahstlcally, the members (especially Russia and Chma) may be more open to negotiate mtenm steps, such as a ban on exports and transfers of land mmes This could prove pohtlcally troublesome for the Clinton adnumstratlon, as interim steps would challenge Its conumtment to aggressively pursue negotlatlons for a comprehensive ban.
That concludes the brief discourse on current U S. strategies Is there a defimte answer to the question regarding ends, ways, and means3 Yes, there were carefully crafted ambiguous respect Rather, it must earn it "The pnce should be paid, the role of leadership should be creatively and energetically assumed because the "deadly legacy" of land mmes is an affront to a humane order of politics It should not be allowed to threaten yet another generation of children and civihans "43
In order to llrmt the additional risk from a umlateral ban, the rmhtary should move quickly to aggressively pursue alternative technologies, but not hold a umlateral ban hostage to fieldmg alternatives Different approaches may mclude replacmg anti-personnel land mines with an area demal system, or to have a "man-m-the-loop" that can control the system, an element that is missmg from anti-personnel land mmes There IS some evidence to indicate that alternatives should not be linear one-for-one replacements, instead they should create the same end-state the land mines were intended to produce, i e channeling enemy forces. In the Institute for Defense Analysis study referenced earher, Dr. Blddle suggested that symmetrical alternatives, such as mcreased artillery fire or non-explosive obstacles, did not offer as much potential as asymmetrical alternatives He concluded that increased numbers of direct fire systems or unproved artillery fire effectiveness provided opportunities to compensate for the effects of land mmes at lower costs, even rf the effects did not resemble those of a mmefield Perhaps one of the more &fficult decisions will be whether or not to make alternative technologies available to other countries as they are developed. Depending on the technology, there may be concerns regardmg technology transfers as well as concerns regarding weapons prohferation Any transfer of alternatives would have to be made available worldwide, otherwise it would mflame the rationale for contmued use of cheap land mmes throughout the developing world There is already a transfer issue --should the U S freely export its family of self-destructmg land mmes or self-destructmg technologes m order that other countries could 43Hehu-, "Land Ames A Pohcal-Moral Assessment,", 111 replace then stockpiles of long-hved mmes 7 This is probably not acceptable because anti-personnel land mines, both long-lived and self-destructmg, have been severely stigmatized by the mtematlonal commumty However, if non-lmear alternatives are not restricted by technolo,v transfer issues, they may provide a necessary mcennve for others to implement bans on long-lived antr-personnel land mmes Consequently, as the U.S develops altematrves, it should consider mcludmg an operational requirement that they be made available worldwide Once the U S ratrfies the 1996 amended protocol to the CCW, momentum will build as other states also ratify the protocol, movmg the community of states toward a robust CCW process In order to adequately capture that momentum, the U S should begm now to develop a framework for conslderatlon Durmg the 1996 CCW negotratrons, the Australia delegation tabled a proposal that could potentrally form the basis for such a framework The premise of thrs proposal was that uncondmonal tactical use of long-hved mmes was unsustamable, and that mrhtanes should convert to self-destructmg mmes wrth a short self-destruct penod The proposal allowed for two exceptrons Frost, countnes could retam long-lived mmes "for the strategc defense of borders'and other boundaries, and for the protection of fixed mstallatlons of importance for national secunty "46 Second, the proposal recorazed the need for a phase-m penod to convert exlstmg stocks to self-destructmg mmes Although sound m pnncrple, the Australian proposal was tabled too early, as many delegatrons had not yet exposed then negotratmg posittons Thrs proposal offers several advantages First, rt recognizes the importance of border Issues, and wrthout accommodatrons for use on borders, there will most certainly be no near term agreement. Second, rt will provide an opporhmny to brmg Russia, Chma, India, and Palustan mto the dialogue, as zt addresses then legmmate mlhtary requirements Thud, rt 1s also consistent wtth U S domestic law (the Leahy use moratonum) fcare? First, the global land mme cnsls 1s real and current strategies are not workmg Second, the ability to create real solutions to the land mme crisis IS basically a htmus test as to whether or not the U S can lead m a world that has slgmficantly changed. How the U S proceeds on the land mme debate, both internally and m addressing the global cnsls, will be mdlcatlve of whether or not the U S has recogmzed and IS mllmg to step up to Its role as a leader, pursumg shared mterests and values Yes, the land mine cnsls IS representative of the complex issues facing the U S as it prepares to cross the bndge to the next century There IS no smgle, simple solution to the land mme issue --only &fficult choices -_ (7, 282 Words) 
